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What does quantum mechanics tell us, if taken realistically, as a fundamental theory, which applies to 
everything? After a century of debate, it seems we are no nearer to an answer to this question.  But in an 
important respect we know better what is in contention: it is the Everett interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, which is also known as the many-worlds interpretation. First advocated by Hugh Everett III in 
1957, it is the only realist interpretation of quantum mechanics still standing. On every other approach the 
answer is that quantum mechanics tells us nothing when applied to everything because it makes no sense 
taken in this way; the theory must be changed. In the words of John Bell: “Either the wavefunction, as given 
by the Schrödinger equation, is not everything, or it is not right,”1 seeking to reduce the options to either 
modifying the Schrödinger equation, or supplementing it with hidden variables. But “everything” for Bell 
meant “everything in the known universe”; ignored was the alternative that the wavefunction (as given by 
the Schrödinger equation) describes more than the known universe – that it describes a quantum mechanical 
multiverse, a superposition of worlds, of which ours is only one. 
The idea is fantastical, but quantum mechanics is a theory like no other, a revolution still in the making 
after all these years. The worlds are derived from the unitary formalism; they are not put in by hand. 
Measurement interactions, we know, lead to macroscopic superpositions – if the unitary dynamics operates 
untrammelled -- where each state in the superposition contains a record of a sequence of events as if 
obtained by the measurement postulates, as Everett gave a simple model to show. The apparent conflict 
between quantum theory and locality, as codified in Bell’s theorem, is removed: the interpretation extends 
without modification to relativistic quantum theory. It really is interpretation of the equations: it neither 
modifies nor supplements them, save that the Schrödinger equation is taken to be universal. It offers a 
radical and novel understanding of how determinism can be reconciled with indeterminism, solving puzzles 
in the philosophy of probability that have bedeviled the subject for decades. It provides the basis for 
quantum cosmology, free of the measurement problem. 
These claims, of course, are all controversial. In a certain sense, if these arguments all stand up to scrutiny, 
the case for the Everett interpretation becomes overwhelming. No wonder they are strongly contested: there 
is simply too much at stake.  
Much recent literature has been on the probability interpretation,2 but there is another aspect to the 
development of the Everett interpretation in the last three decades that is just as important: in terms of 
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decoherence theory. This frees the interpretation from dependence on the notion of measurement, and 
enhances the argument about records. It tells us how the worlds are composed. It allows the separation of 
the probability interpretation from the question of the structure of the state. It provides an Everettian 
“tapestry of events,” made out in entirely categorical properties and relations, that now include phase 
relations and amplitudes, on which the probability interpretation is to be based. 
This chapter is on this structural interpretation of the wave function, rather than the probability 
interpretation, which is the subject of a companion paper (Saunders 2021). In particular, it is on the structure 
of the wave  function as made out in terms of the quantum histories formalism. But it is also on Everett’s 
writings, and especially his “automaton” argument, as published in 1957. I shall start with this, for it makes 
clearer the role of decoherence theory in going beyond Everett’s writings (although as we shall see, there 
are hints of it in his “long” dissertation, eventually published in 1973 as “The theory of the universal wave 
function”3). Everett’s much more widely read doctoral thesis was one fifth the length, published under the 
title  “‘Relative State’ formulation of quantum mechanics.”  (Everett, 1957). It was redacted from the “long” 
dissertation at the insistence of his supervisor John Wheeler, who had long advocated Bohr’s philosophy. 
It contained the argument from records, and thanks to his “Note added in proof” it conveyed the overall 
idea, but much was omitted. Everett was never to write on quantum mechanics again. 
 
1 Everett’s Automaton Argument 
The strange gap between the determinism of the Schrödinger equation and the indeterminism evident at the 
observational level is bridged by the so-called measurement postulates. The first is given by the rule: 
Born rule: on measurement of 𝑄 = ∑ 𝜆!𝑃!!  on a system S prepared in the state |𝜙⟩, the outcome 
𝜆! is obtained with probability 
"𝜙#𝑃!𝜙$
"𝜙#𝜙$ . 
(The Pks are projection operators onto eigenstates of Q with eigenvalues lk -- this extends naturally to 
operators with continuous spectra. I will not always respect the distinctions between vectors, 
wavefunctions, and rays, and use the term “state” for all three. By the “amplitude” of a state, I mean its 
norm )⟨𝜙|𝜙⟩.) 
The Born rule has the flavor of a “correspondence rule” in logical empiricist philosophy of science, or 
perhaps an “operational definition”: a rule that links theoretical concepts to observable ones (or theoretical 
terms to observation sentences). It provides the minimal interpretation necessary to submit quantum 
mechanics to test – provided, of course, recipes could be given for building appropriate measurement and 
state-preparation devices. The latter required purely classical concepts, according to one influential 
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interpretation (Bohr’s). That posed an obstacle to taking quantum mechanics as a fundamental theory: how 
then could it be based purely on classical concepts? (Bohr thought of quantum mechanics as a 
“generalization” of classical mechanics, rather than a theory distinct from it;4 here Wheeler departed from 
Bohr, as he sought to quantize gravity, governing the macroscopic.) 
The Born rule is the first and most important of the measurement postulates, but it says nothing about what 
happens to the state on measurement. It is usually supplemented by the: 
Projection postulate: for a repeatable experiment on S prepared in the state |𝜙⟩, if the outcome on 
measurement is 𝜆!, then S is left in the state |𝜙!⟩ = 𝑃!|𝜙⟩. 
The projection postulate is sometimes stated without the restriction to repeatability, but then it is very often 
false. Very often, in practice, the state of the system is changed in uncontrollable ways on measurement, or 
the system is even completely obliterated (so there is no state). But given that the macroscopic outcome is 
indeterministic, it is reasonable to suppose that the state of the measured system where it does still exist has 
changed indeterministically, and if it makes sense to assign a quantum state to the measurement apparatus 
as well, it too must have been subject to indeterministic change. How is all this indeterminism at the level 
of the state consistent with the Schrödinger equation? 
This is the infamous measurement problem of quantum mechanics, in what is probably its simplest guise. 
There are the two realist solutions already noted: add additional variables, or modify the Schrödinger 
equation. Everett offered a third and remarkable alternative: the superposition of all the indeterministic 
changes evolves deterministically, in accordance with the Schrödinger equation.  
Everett’s strategy to establish this conclusion was to show that a superposition of records of indeterminism 
could be obtained in this way, satisfying the Schrödinger equation – and specifically, records as could be 
encoded in a mechanical model. “The observer” was to treated as a mechanical system interacting with the 
measured system, with the unitary equations applied to them both together. The answer to the question 
“What is observed?” is to be read off from this dynamical model, in terms of what can be laid down in 
records or in memory. This solved the problem, posed by Bohr, of how a system could be treated as both 
physically closed and yet under experimental control. Bohr had argued that physical closure renders 
external observation impossible (unlike in classical physics, where the interactions needed for observation 
to be possible could be made arbitrarily small).6  Everett’s answer was to model the observer as within the 
closed system.  
A great deal hangs on this argument. Is it acceptable to read off what is observed, from a direct dynamical 
model of observation, modeling the observer alongside the system under observation? Is Everett’s approach 
in this respect a heightened realism, an extreme form of physicalism? No: as scientific method, it has 
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impeccable credentials. It was important in the early modern period in establishing the Copernican system 
(a comparison Everett himself made), namely, in the analysis of what would be perceived, according to the 
theory, were the Earth in motion about the sun (showing there would be no great wind, no deviations in 
falling bodies). It was essential in the discovery of symmetries (think of Galileo’s ship, and Faraday’s cage). 
It was essential to Isaac Newton’s method in the Principia. It played an essential role in Einstein’s analysis 
of length contraction and time dilation in special relativity. Even Bohr extolled the general principle: “it is 
the theory that tells us what is observable.”7 The method is part and parcel of all the great discoveries in 
fundamental physics – save one. So is the practice of studying those theories at maximum strength, with 
the fundamental equations of each theory taken to have maximal scope – save one. Quantum mechanics is 
the one exception. Von Neumann had made the first important step, of modelling the observer in quantum 
mechanics, in his Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, published (in German) in 1932, but 
he was not yet ready to study the consequences of taking the Schrödinger equation to hold unrestrictedly. 
That honour fell to Everett. 
Consider, for the sake of definiteness, a measurement of the z-component of spin of an atom of silver, as in 
the Stern-Gerlach experiment. The interaction Hamiltonian couples the magnetic moment of the atom in 
passaging a magnetic field with a certain symmetry, in such a way as to correlate the momentum of the 
atom of silver with the state of its component of spin, in that direction, either “+” or “-“. The result is that 
the atom drifts in one of two opposite directions. A subsequent measurement of position is then directly 
correlated with the state of this component of spin. Depending on how the position measurement is 
performed (it may be made with wide latitude), the measurement may be repeatable. Suppose that it is. 
Then schematically, if the apparatus is to function as intended, when the initial state of the atom is |𝜙%⟩ 
and the apparatus is in its “ready” state |0⟩, it should be driven by the unitary dynamics governing the 
measurement, denote 𝑈&, to display the outcome “+”; and when the initial state of the atom is |𝜙'⟩ and the 
apparatus is in the ready state |0⟩, it should be driven by 𝑈& to display the outcome “-”; and in either case, 
for repeatability, the spin state of the silver atom should be unchanged. That is, 𝑈& should satisfy the 
protocols: 
																																																					|𝜙%⟩⨂|0⟩ 		(!
01 |𝜙%⟩⨂| +⟩																																																																															(1a)	 
																																																				|𝜙'⟩⨂|0⟩ 		(!
01 |𝜙'⟩⨂| −⟩.																																																																														(1b) 
But it then follows, for any unitary dynamics like this, that for an initial state  
																																																				|𝜓⟩ = 𝑐%|𝜙%⟩ +	𝑐'|𝜙'⟩																																																																																			(2) 




01 𝑐%|𝜙%⟩⨂| +⟩ +	𝑐'|𝜙'⟩⨂| −⟩	.																																																	(3) 
What could the RHS mean? Von Neumann’s answer was that something very like correspondence rules 
were needed (although he did not use that terminology); for, he argued, mathematical expressions on their 
own, governing values of quantities, never amounted to a statement about what is observed. Needed was a 
further link to “experience”: to a statement about what would be perceived or observed, or experienced; 
and this notwithstanding that mental events always had correlates in the physical (his famous “thesis of 
psychophysical parallelism”, one of the core tenets of realism). According to von Neumann, rules like this 
were needed as much for Eq. (1a) and (1b), delivering probability one for seeing spin-up, given Eq. (1a), 
and probability one for seeing spin-down, given Eq. (1b), as they were needed given the superposition Eq. 
(3), when the probabilities are different from one. The rules were the measurement postulates (or what von 
Neumann called “Process 1”). Only in this way, said von Neumann, was the dynamical model including 
the observer “non-vacuous.”  
Everett, who studied von Neumann’s book assiduously (it first appeared in English translation in 1955), 
took the thesis of psychophysical parallelism rather more to heart than did its author. If you want to know 
about the mental, he reasoned, sufficient to make sense of measurements, then model perception and 
memory explicitly. Suppose the apparatus to be a simple mechanical device, able to interact with the 
measured system in the sense of perception, but also able to store records of such perceptions in memory. 
Let the ready state of the apparatus with no records in memory be |0;… ⟩; in place of Eq. (1a) and Eq. (1b), 
require that in addition require the positive spin outcome be recorded in memory as “+,” and the negative 
as “–,” and that the device resets to “0”. That is, suppose that we can build a mechanical device so that 
under the Schrödinger equation it satisfies the new protocols:   
																																																							|𝜙%⟩⨂|0;… ⟩ (!
01 |𝜙%⟩⨂|+;… ⟩ ("
01	|𝜙%⟩|0;+,… ⟩				 																																(4a) 
																																																							|𝜙'⟩⨂|0;… ⟩ (!
01 |𝜙'⟩⨂|−;… ⟩ ("
01	|𝜙'⟩|0;−,… ⟩				 																																	(4b) 
where 𝑈& is the measurement process as before, and 𝑈* further records the outcome and resets the 
apparatus. “Experience” is now to be read off from what is registered and what is laid down in memory.  
What happens now, under these new protocols, when the initial state is the superposition |𝜓⟩? The answer, 
from linearity, is:   
																																										|𝜓⟩⨂|0;… ⟩
(!
01𝑐%|𝜙%⟩⨂|+;… ⟩ + 𝑐'|𝜙'⟩⨂|−;… ⟩																																 
																																																					
("
01𝑐%|𝜙%⟩⨂|0;+⋯⟩ +	𝑐'|𝜙'⟩⨂|0;−⋯ ⟩.										 
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The final state is a superposition of a record of positive z-component of spin, with a record of negative spin. 
On repeating the experiment (on the same microscopic system), we obtain:  






01 𝑐%|𝜙%⟩⨂|0;+ +⋯ ⟩ +	𝑐'|𝜙'⟩⨂|0;− −⋯⟩.																																													 
The final state is a superposition of the record of a “+” outcome followed by a second “+” outcome, with 
the record of a “-“ outcome followed by a second “-“ outcome – where each of the latter is just what would 
have been obtained, on von Neumann’s terms, by employing his Process 1 (essentially the projection 
postule, extended so as to apply to the state of the measurement device). 
What does it mean to have records of measurements in a superposition – for there to be two states, each 
describing a record of measurement, in a superposition? In itself the concept is hardly unfamiliar, in that 
every student of quantum mechanics is used to the idea of superpositions of contradictory properties at the 
microscopic level. It isn’t even particularly mysterious when divorced from the measurement problem: 
there are superpositions of light signals and radio programs and TV channels in the electromagnetic field 
as well – even, or especially, when considered purely classically. This is not a problem. (But it can be made 
to seem mysterious – by insisting not that there is a superposition of radio programs, but that there is a radio 
program in a superposition – a point we shall come back to.)  
Nor are we unused to multiple realities somehow in relation to each other. The world as I write these words 
is as real as can be, but for you it is some time ago – and your world, as you read these words, is as real as 
can be for you too, although it is far in the future for me. We have learned, although it is still a matter of 
philosophical controversy, how to understand these worlds as both existing, as being worlds at different 
times; Everett invites us to understand two different outcomes as both existing, as being worlds that are 
orthogonal.8  
But if in this way we may understand the idea of distinct processes taking place in a superposition, each as 
if the projection postulate had been applied, both processes happen with certainty. Where, in all this, is 
probability?  
In the case of Eq. (5), the Born rule adds to the projection postulate (according to which just one of Eq. (4a) 
and Eq. (4b) is realized) the fact that the probabilities of the outcomes are	𝑝 = |,#|
$
|,#|$%|,%|$
 and 1 − 𝑝 
respectively. In the Everett interpretation, it follows from the Schrödinger equation that the amplitudes or 
the superposed outcomes are )𝑝,)(1 − 𝑝) respectively. In neither case do we as yet have a connection 
 7 
with any observable quantity. To do this, what is needed, of course, are multiple experiments: a large 
number N of silver atoms all prepared in the same state Eq. (2), and independently measured in accordance 
with Eq. (4) (whether at the same time or at different times). The result will be a superposition of 2- states, 
each a record of a unique sequence of measurement outcomes, each the same as that which would have 
been obtained by veridical observation, had that sequence resulted by chance, using the measurement 
postulates.  
Everett called them branches. It is not too hard to see that the connection between amplitude and Born-rule 
probability is retained for multiple experiments. The amplitude of each branch, at the end of N experiments, 
as determined by the unitary evolution alone (together with the initial state), equals the square root of the 
Born-rule probability for that sequence of outcomes (just multiply together the probabilities for the results 
taken sequentially). Now consider the superposition of all those branches with the same relative frequency 
for the “+” outcome; not quite so obviously, the amplitude of this superposition is highly sensitive to the 
discrepancy, if any, between that relative frequency and the Born rule quantity for the “+” outcome, the 
quantity 𝑝.  Let the discrepancy be 𝜀; then the amplitude falls off exponentially as exp−𝑁𝜀./𝜅, where 𝜅 =
4𝑝(1 − 𝑝) and N is, as before, the number of trials.9 It is the first of a number of quantum Bernoulli 
theorems, the quantum analogues of the laws of large numbers: the amplitudes of branches with the “wrong” 
relative frequencies fall off exponentially quickly in the number of trials, in comparison with the amplitudes 
of Born-rule compliant branches.  
The squared amplitudes, in these essential respects, behave just like probabilities. Why the square? Everett 
had an answer to that question too. Let µ be a probability measure over orthogonal branches. Then it should 
satisfy additivity: 
																																																							|𝜓⟩ = ∑ |𝜙⟩ ⇒ 𝜇[|𝜓⟩] = ∑𝜇[|𝜙⟩]																																																																(5)                                                 
But then, if it is a function of the branch amplitude, it must be the square. (Let µ(Öx) = f(x). Then from Eq. 
(5), f(S|ck|2) = Sf(|ck|2), so f is linear in x, f = kx for some constant k. So µ(x) = f(x2) = kx2. Here, k is fixed by 
normalization; Everett also showed that the phase is irrelevant.) 
If now we may interpret the squared amplitudes of branches produced by measurements as the physical 
correlates of the concept of physical probability, we will have explained the Born rule. Can we? That 
question we are postponing to a companion paper (Saunders 2021). In the rest of this, we consider rather 
how Everett’s ideas relate to decoherence theory, and what difference that theory makes. But his needs 
some more history.  
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2 Realism about Measurements 
The arguments thus summarized were all in Everett’s “‘Relative state’ formulation of quantum mechanics.” 
What of the relative state? Given an entanglement of the form (3), there is no choice of basis, respecting 
the tensor-product structure between the silver atom and the apparatus, in which the state is a product state; 
there is no way of attributing a unique pure state to the silver atom, or to the measurement apparatus. But 
from the total state and a pure state of the apparatus, a unique pure state of the silver atom can be defined. 
This is its relative state.   
On a more deflationary way of putting it: given an entanglement, there are many correlations between states 
of subsystems. “Relative state” is useful terminology, and reminds us that the structure of the quantum state 
is relational. There is however a connection with the extended projection postulate. Let the relative state of 
|𝜑⟩ in an entanglement |Ψ⟩ be |𝜓⟩; then up to normalization, |𝜑⟩	⨂|𝜓⟩ = 𝑃|/⟩⨂𝐼 |Ψ⟩. The collapse of the 
wave-function, in terms of the extended projection postulate, is relativization of state, relativized to a state 
of the apparatus. (As Everett put it: “the discontinuous ‘jump’ into an eigenstate is only a relative 
proposition, dependent upon the mode of decomposition of the total wave-function into the superposition, 
and relative to a particularly chosen apparatus-coordinate value” (Everett, 1957, p. 457).) It naturally 
generalizes to the relative state of a range of values of dynamical variables (and not just eigenvalues): 
replace 𝑃|/⟩ by a projection 𝑃1 onto values of variables in some set ∆ (a coarse-graining of the parameter 
space).  
But this came later; well into the 1980s, the focus was on simple bipartite systems and the exact definition 
of a unique basis, in terms of which to decompose the total state, among them that given by the biorthogonal 
decomposition (or “Schmidt decomposition”). This was a harbinger of other ways of reading Everett’s 
“Relative states” paper. For any entangled state |Ψ⟩ of two subsystems, there exist orthonormal bases 
{|𝜑!⟩} and {|𝜂!⟩} such that |Ψ⟩ = ∑ 𝑐!|𝜑!⟩! ⨂|𝜂!⟩. If |𝑐!| ≠ V𝑐2V for 𝑘 ≠ 𝑗, the bases are unique. 
(Equivalently, diagonalize the reduced density matrices of the two subsystems.) Dieter Zeh’s early work 
on decoherence theory made use of biorthogonal decomposition (see e.g. Zeh, 1973), what Everett had 
called the “canonical representation” (Everett, 1973, p. 47). This was also the key to the “modal 
interpretation” (Dieks and Vermaas, 1998), for which the failure of uniqueness eventually proved terminal. 
Zeh’s most important contribution to decoherence theory, in collaboration with Ehrich Joos in 1985, was 
based on rather different ideas.  
There were other distractions. Everett spoke of memories and records: what were they records of? Was the 
approach committed to a model of consciousness,10 and were there only “appearances” of outcomes, rather 
than the outcomes themselves? Everett also spoke of a “memory trajectory of an observer” as being a 
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“branching tree,” suggesting there is only one observer in a superposition, – a question that Everett in the 
long dissertation called a “language difficulty.” Perhaps the theory isn’t committed to a genuine multiplicity 
after all?11 In the two-slit experiment, is there one particle at both slits, or are there two particles? Everett 
also claimed the branches were non-interacting; is that true? And most concerning of all: the branches, the 
basis states entering into the superposition, were defined by the measurement interaction (in effect the 
protocols (1), (3)); but the approach is supposed to be realist, with measurements playing no special role. 
How was this basis to be defined without them?12 
Improving on Everett’s ideas in any of these ways seemed to require new assumptions, new postulates, new 
physics; but any step of that kind compromised the chief selling point of his approach – that it is quantum 
mechanics and nothing else. The problem of basis, the “preferred basis problem,” was the most serious. If 
experiments play no special role (and there is no Born rule to specify the basis), what basis is to be used to 
define the branches? And relatedly, when exactly does branching occur?  
Bryce DeWitt, the first to take Everett’s ideas seriously (the terminology “many worlds” is due to him), 
wrote on them in a number of articles (anthologized in DeWitt and Graham (1973), but mostly avoided the 
question of basis. I have found only one comment that directly addressed this question:  
The student should perhaps be reminded again at this point that reality is not described by the state 
vector alone, but by the state vector plus a set of dynamical operator variables satisfying definite 
dynamical equations. Decompositions of the form [Eq. (2), (4)] are not to be regarded as meaningful 
if they are merely abstract mathematical exercises in Hilbert space. Indeed such mathematical 
decompositions can be performed in an infinity of ways. Only those decompositions are meaningful 
which reflect the behavior of a concrete dynamical system.13  
But the only mentioned systems were experiments, the only dynamical equations were for kinds of 
measurement interactions. “The many-worlds theory,” according to DeWitt, rested on two postulates, both 
of which he attributed to Everett: the “postulate of mathematical content,” concerning operator algebras 
and Hilbert-space theory, and the “postulate of complexity,” namely, that “the world is decomposable into 
systems and apparata.”14  Here talk of “complexity” was a fig leaf: since when did a fundamental theory 
postulate the existence of measurement devices? Everett had made no such suggestion. What of a world 
without any people, without any devices?  
We find in Everett’s long dissertation a rather different set of ideas. He spent time on the definition of the 
entropy function in classical and quantum statistical mechanics, and on the concept of thermodynamic 
equilibrium. He pointed out that the unitary equations for many-particle systems did not imply that particles 
diffuse formlessly: electrons and protons in a box are not uniformly diffused, rather, they are diffused as 
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atoms of hydrogen, and so on for more structured molecules and composites. He reminded us that the 
diffusion of the center of mass (‘centroid’) wave-function for a large numbers of particles in a bound state 
is extremely slow, for even the smallest visible specks of matter. Everett’s proposal was to use, as basis 
states, wave-functions for centres of mass, as functions on three-dimensional space, well-localized in 
position and momentum. 
What had always blocked this line of reasoning as an account of how macroscopic physics emerges from 
the unitary equations of quantum mechanics is that states in general do not have this form (and in particular: 
states following a quantum measurement do not have this form). But on Everett’s approach the development 
of macroscopic superpositions is a feature, not a bug: 
The general state of a system of macroscopic objects does not, however, ascribe any nearly definite 
positions and momenta to the individual bodies. Nevertheless, any general state can at any instant 
be analyzed into a superposition of states each of which does represent the bodies with fairly well 
defined positions and momenta.  
Everett concluded with a reference to von Neumann’s construction of projections onto approximately well-
localised regions of the one-particle phase space, what von Neumann had called “elementary building 
blocks of the macroscopic description of the world.”15    
So can the preferred basis be simply stipulated, chosen so that each basis state describes the macroscopic 
in recognizably classical terms? It is sometimes said that if there is to be a preferred basis, it must be 
postulated – written into the axioms of quantum theory – for the Everett interpretation to be well-defined. 
But neither stipulation nor postulation is needed: the state can be expanded in any basis, and using another, 
we do not obtain a new and different reality. It is the same reality, only divided up in a new way. Divide it 
then in the way that makes perspicuous its structure, perhaps one among several. 
Are there no constraints? For example, is it true that the branches will be non-interacting? Everett had said 
this followed from linearity of the Schrödinger equation alone – so, presumably, whatever basis is used – 
but here he was less sure-footed. It is true that from linearity, each state evolves as if the other is not there; 
given unitarity as well, if two such states are orthogonal, they remain orthogonal as they evolve in time. 
But that does not mean that on subsequent branching, the states thus produced will not interfere with each 
other. Take, for example, the two-slit experiment. On passage through the slits, the photon is in a 
superposition of two orthogonal states, each originating from one of the slits; they remain orthogonal under 
any unitary transformation, including their evolution to the screen. But there is interference at the screen: 
represent each as a superposition of spatially localized states, at the screen, and the latter are not all 
orthogonal to one another. 
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However, what the two-slit experiment also demonstrates is that overlap in configuration space is necessary 
for interference.  This suggests that states describing large numbers of molecules all well-localized in space 
with well-defined velocities, even at the microscopic level, can no longer interfere. If the difficulty in 
getting states like this to overlap in configuration space needed spelling out, Everett could have cited David 
Bohm, who had written on it both in his then recent book Quantum Theory, and in the two-part paper on 
hidden variables that quickly followed.16   
It is sometimes said that decoherence theory is needed to show that Everett’s branch states do not interfere 
with each other, and it surely offers quantitative control; but the greater importance of decoherence theory 
lies elsewhere. 
What of the comparison of the state to a tree-like structure? This was forced by the protocol (3), where the 
branching is defined by a measuring interaction for given initial state, and it fits with the analysis of chance: 
chance events are branching events. The recombination of branches has no such interpretation. But the same 
reasoning would seem to apply to states of macroscopic bodies differently localized in phase space: we do 
not expect a superposition of such states to unitarily evolve into a single localized state, for that would seem 
to require that they be finely synchronized (we shall come back to this shortly). 
How do states well-localized in position and momentum unitarily evolve? When the mass is not too small 
or the time-scales are too large, the answer is: classically. To continue Everett’s argument, it is not just that 
states of large numbers of particles well-localized in phase space do not interfere, and not only that at each 
instant in time they are recognizably interpretable in classical terms; it is that they behave classically: 
Each of these states then propagates approximately according to classical laws, so that the general 
state can be viewed as a superposition of quasi-classical states propagating according to nearly 
classical trajectories. In other words, if the masses are large or the time short, there will be strong 
correlations between the initial (approximate) positions and momenta and those at a later time, with 
the dependence being given approximately by classical mechanics. 
A macroscopic body is then a propagating quasiclassical state, approximately obeying a classical 
Hamiltonian equation – it is dynamically defined. Notice now how the “language difficulty” is handled. A 
quasiclassical state propagating as such is a thing, so when a superposition develops, do not say “a thing is 
in a superposition,” say rather “there is a superposition of things.” (It is not a beam of light in a superposition 
of two directions, it is two beams in a superposition.) There is the sideways view of the state at each time, 
as a temporal sequence of superpositions, and there is the vertical view, of a superposition of temporal 
sequences, of “memory trajectories” or “propagating quasiclassical states” – each in accordance with 
classical equations.  
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Applied to the automaton, made up of mechanical parts (the servo-mechanism), Everett’s model of the 
observer, it completed his argument:   
Since large scale objects obeying classical laws have a place in our theory of pure wave mechanics, 
we have justified the introduction of models for observers consisting of classically describable, 
automatically functioning machinery, and the treatment of observation is non-vacuous.17  
The dynamical circle is closed, linking micro to macro, where the latter obeys classical equations, as follow 
from the Schrödinger equation, ensuring that the protocol (3) is satisfied. The measurement protocols are 
not merely stipulated, they have to be physically instantiated  
But although the circle is closed, it still depends on measurement processes; without them, what is the 
superposition, and what are the branches? DeWitt had a reason for his “postulate of complexity”; how to 
dispense with measurement interactions? But now there is an obvious candidate for an answer, prefigured 
by Everett: these propagating quasiclassical states have only nearly classical trajectories, and where that 
approximation is not satisfied, there is branching.   
Everett did not take this further step; nor did he offer an argument for his claim of approximate classicality. 
But he could surely have provided one, drawing, if he wished, from Bohm’s book, which included a chapter 
on the WKB approximation. (Everett cited this book alongside von Neumann’s as his primary influences.) 
Here is a sketch based on Ehrenfest’s theorem in the simple case of a single massive particle with position 
operator x. The theorem states that in the state |𝜓⟩ and for the potential function V(x,t) (using the notation 




= −〈𝛁𝑉(𝒙, 𝑡)〉3.																																 
It does not tell us that a particle behaves classically; failing an interpretation of the expectation value 〈𝑥〉3 
for a single system, in an arbitrary state, it tells us nothing at all. But in the special case where |𝜓⟩ is well-
localized in position and velocity, and the gradient of the potential is approximately constant over such 
regions and slowly varying in time, we can replace the RHS by the gradient of the potential as a function 




= −𝛁𝑉(〈𝐱〉3, 𝑡)																																 
and whatever exactly 〈𝒙〉3 means, it obeys the same equation as does the position of a classical particle; so 
long as the approximations hold, 〈𝒙〉3 behaves just like the classical particle position behaves. (This 
argument extends to systems of many weakly-interacting bodies, each localized in position and 
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momentum.18) And where it fails to hold, then there is branching of such trajectories, and in the branching, 
the quantum jump, and the appearance of randomness. 
The nearly satisfied equations and the propagating quasiclassical states go together; neither is defined 
without the other. It is these patterns in the wave-function that define the preferred basis in the Everett 
interpretation. They are dynamical patterns. They have to be derived from the unitary formalism, they 
cannot be “stipulated.” In this respect the rules that defined the branches in the case of the measurement of 
spin – the measurement protocols – are a special case. They are given substance by the design and 
fabrication of a real physical system that instantiates them, according to the Schrödinger equation.  
Worlds exist insofar as rule-based branches exist. That such branches evolve in accordance with those rules 
is basis-independent; use of a basis that assigns orthogonal states to each branch at each time is a matter of 
convenience. There is a parallel with the choice of coordinates in general relativity: one choice may be 
better adapted to the matter distribution, and describe it in a more perspicuous form, than another.  
Might there be essentially just the one set of rules of this kind, one pattern, namely of states well-localized 
in phase space, satisfying classical Hamiltonian equations? With these as the building blocks, we can 
imagine recovering all of macroscopic physics without having to revisit its quantum origins. But that would 
already have seemed fanciful in Everett’s time. Take for example the property of rigidity; no choice of a 
potential function for a system of molecules can account for it in classical dynamical terms.  
With more urgency, then, what are these rules and states? To what approximations do they hold, for what 
initial states and quantum Hamiltonians, when does branching occur, and of what are branches made?  
 
3 Quantum Histories and Quasiclassical Domains 
The list of classical or quasiclassical equations that have been derived from quantum mechanics is lengthy. 
Examples include Boltzmann’s equation, the Focker-Plank equation, the Langevin equation, the Navier-
Stokes equation, the Lindblad equation, the Joos-Zeh equation (quantum Brownian motion), the Caldera-
Leggett model, and for sufficiently well-behaved potentials and short enough times, classical Hamiltonian 
equations. Of course, they were derived in a number of different ways; nevertheless, they are subject to 
theoretical checks, using the unitary formalism assisted as needed by the measurement postulates or their 
generalizations.  
These can all, loosely, be called the business of decoherence theory, mostly developed independent of 
Everett’s ideas (for example, in quantum optics in the 1960s, and in open quantum systems theory in the 
1970s). But decoherence theory, on inspection, is itself a mass of different models, for different kinds of 
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dynamical variables, in different coupling regimes and environments.20 Some of them, spin-foam models 
for example, have little to do with ordinary matter. And those that do, even if embedded in or derived from 
non-relativistic quantum mechanics, do not in themselves speak for the Everett interpretation. The crucial 
question is whether the values of these quasiclassical variables, as they vary in time, obeying these 
phenomenological equations, can be derived from the unitary formalism in the way Everett had suggested: 
as superpositions of quasiclassical states where each of the latter propagates along definite trajectories, with 
branching quantified in terms of quantum dissipation and noise.  
A proper answer to this question would require an investigation in each case taken separately, but they 
share much in common. They are mostly equations for many-particle systems. They are all derived by 
coarse-graining: the integrating out of some degrees of freedom, the definition of new “effective” degrees 
of freedom, as coarse-grained values of the old, including coarse-graining in time and the separation of 
“slow” from “fast” variables. The most versatile and widely used technique is probably the path-integral 
method, but there is a simple Hilbert-space framework as well: the quantum histories formalism. At low 
energies the two are translatable into each other.21 From the quantum histories formalism the connection to 
Everett is direct. 
Let us begin with a single time 𝑡!. Let 𝛼! (for fixed k) range over coarse-grained cells of some parameter 
space ℳ at time 𝑡! (phase space, for example). Let 𝑃4& be the associated projectors, so that for 𝛼! ≠ 𝛼!′, 
𝑃4& and 𝑃4&'  are orthogonal, with ∑ 𝑃4& = 𝐼4& . When ℳ is a parameter space for commuting variables, the 
Cartesian product of their spectra, the associated families of projections are the basic tools of spectral 
theory. When ℳ is phase space, a more complicated construction is needed, as given by von Neumann’s 
“elementary building blocks”. 
It is obvious how to coarse-grain: pass to sums of projection operators, projecting onto unions of subspaces. 
Let {𝛽!} be a coarse-graining of {𝛼!} (so each cell 𝛽! in the parameter space is the union of some of the 
𝛼!s, denote 𝛼! ⊂ 𝛽! ); then the projection operator corresponding to 𝛽! is:  
𝑃5! = h 𝑃4&
4&;	4&⊂5&
	.																																												 
Sums of commuting projectors correspond to the union of the 𝛼!s , and products to intersections. 
All of this is entirely familiar. What is distinctive of the quantum histories formalism is to go over to the 
Heisenberg picture, and put what has so far been a purely notional time parameter to work. For each time	𝑡!, 
define    
𝑃4&(𝑡!) ≝ 𝑈(−𝑡!)𝑃9&𝑈(𝑡!)																														 
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where 𝑈(𝑡!) = 𝑒':;<& and H is the quantum Hamiltonian. Consider now a sequence of times	𝑡- > 𝑡-'= >
⋯ > 𝑡=, and let 𝛼 = 	 〈𝛼- , 𝛼-'=, … , 𝛼=〉 represent a corresponding sequence of parameters. Define the 
associated “chain” or “class” operators 𝐶9 = 𝑃4((𝑡-)… . 𝑃4)(𝑡=), in general the product of non-commuting 
operators. Let the initial state 𝑡! = 0 be |𝜓⟩; then 𝐶9|𝜓⟩ is obtained by: unitarily propagate |𝜓⟩ to 𝑡=, project 
out the state  𝑃9)𝑈(𝑡=)|𝜓⟩, unitarily propagate to 𝑡., project out the state 𝑃4$𝑈(𝑡. − 𝑡=)𝑃4)𝑈(𝑡=)|𝜓⟩, and 
so on – obtaining precisely the same state, at each time, as were a sequence of measurements performed, 
up to that time, yielding the outcomes 𝛼=, 𝛼., …	,  and applying the extended projection postulate (whether 
sequentially or just at the end). The Schrödinger-picture end-state obtained in this way has amplitude equal 
to the square root of the product of all the Born rule probabilities for that sequence of outcomes. Unitarily 
evolve it back to 𝑡* and we obtain the Heisenberg-picture state 𝐶9|𝜓⟩, representing that history. 
Each history 𝑎, as given by the sequence of parameters 〈𝛼- , 𝛼-'=, … , 𝛼=〉, may seem to have nothing to do 
with any unitary equations (they may appear quite random, for example). But the superposition of all these 
propagating sequences, up to any time, is exactly the same as the unitary evolution of the total state to that 
time. That is: 







|𝜓⟩ = 𝑈(𝑡-)|𝜓⟩		 
where the last equality follows from the identity ∑ 𝐶99 = 𝐼.		The Schrödinger-picture states 𝑈(𝑡-)𝐶9|𝜓⟩	are 
the states of Everett’s branches at 𝑡 = 𝑡-. 
Coarse-graining of projectors, defined by their sums, automatically extends to coarse-grainings of chain 
operators, defined by their sums. If 𝛽 is a coarse-graining of 𝑎, denote 𝑎 ⊂ 𝛽, meaning 𝛼! ⊂ 𝛽! for each 
k, then 




B𝐶4 is self-adjoint and positive: as such it defines a positive operator valued measure (POV 
measure), of the sort that now widely supplements the measurement postulates. (In the case of two-step 
histories, they were first known as “effects” (Davies, 1984).)  
The Heisenberg picture is the natural one for determining the structure of the orbit of the quantum state, 
under time evolution, in four-dimensional terms. Relativistic quantum field theory, in both Lagrangian and 
axiomatic formulations, almost always uses the Heisenberg picture. We may think of the quantum state as 
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fixed once and for all, and branch vectors 𝐶4|𝜓⟩	as components of this state, representing the corresponding 
histories. The perspective is that of four-dimensionalism, in the metaphysicians’ sense, a “quantum block 
universe.”22  
What are all these histories, exactly? No use has as yet been made of the identification of the a’s as coarse-
grained values of position and momenta; the resolution of the identity could have been anything. But if it 
could be anything, the states 𝐶4|𝜓⟩	may not even be orthogonal, and there would be no guarantee that the 
interpretation of squared amplitude as probability is consistent with coarse-graining. In general, it is not 
true that 
V𝐶5|𝜓nV
. = h |𝐶4|𝜓⟩|.
4;	4⊂5
																																	 
(the so-called “sum rule”).23 But the two, very nearly, go together; when the 𝐶4|𝜓⟩s are orthogonal, the sum 
rule is satisfied (and when the sum rule is satisfied, the real part of ⟨𝜓|𝐶4C
B 𝐶4|𝜓⟩ for 𝛼 ≠ 𝛼′ vanishes). The 
“consistent histories interpretation” was developed in the hope that the sum rule would determine a 
preferred basis (the 𝑃4&’s for each k) all on its own, and thus a well-defined probability measure over a 
space of histories, only one of which is realized, consistent with a ‘one-world’ interpretation of quantum 
mechanics. Just how weak a condition consistency really is was shown by Dowker and Kent (1996), who 
effectively put paid to that ambition.  
The sum rule is recognizably Everett’s additivity requirement, substituting the 𝐶4|𝜓⟩s for Everett’s 
branches. (In the case of Everett’s model of an automaton, if at each time a record is preserved of the 
sequence of outcomes prior to that time, the sum rule is automatically satisfied. Conversely, where two 
histories interfere, there can be no record of events in the two histories that differ.) For an example of 
coarse-graining, state, and Hamiltonian violating the sum rule, consider the two-slit experiment, and for 
projections at each time, coarse-grainings in space: projections onto the aperture Δ= at 𝑡=, at each of the 
slits Δ% and Δ' at 𝑡., and at a fixed region of the screen ΔD at 𝑡D. The histories  𝛼± = 〈Δ=, Δ±, ΔD〉 sum 
as they must to 𝛽 = 〈Δ=, Δ% ∪ Δ', ΔD〉, but not the associated probabilities – indeed 𝐶4#|𝜓⟩	and	𝐶4%|𝜓⟩ are 
not orthogonal, and interfere at the screen.  
Unlike orthogonality of Schrödinger-picture states at an instant of time, the orthogonality of Heisenberg-
picture states representing histories involves the initial state and the Hamiltonian. A decoherent history 
space over a sequence of times 𝑡- >. . > 𝑡! > ⋯ > 𝑡= is a quadruple 〈|𝜓⟩, 𝐻,ℳ, {𝛼!}〉 for which the states 
𝐶4|𝜓⟩ are orthogonal. Such a space has the natural finite measure 𝜇[𝛼] 	≝ 	𝜇[𝐶4|𝜓⟩] = |𝐶4|𝜓⟩|.. Helping 
ourselves temporarily to the notion of probability, 𝜇[𝛼] is the probability of history 𝛼. Let {𝛾}, {𝛿} be coarse-
grainings of {𝛼} for state |𝜓⟩, and let their composition, denote 𝛾 ∗ 𝛿, be the sequence 〈𝛾E ∩ 𝛿E, … , 𝛾= ∩ 𝛿=〉. 
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These conditional probabilities include retrodictive probabilities of some past event, conditional on some 
future event, or conditional on some future sequence of events; or of a past, present, or future sequence of 
events, conditional on some event or sequence of events. (The two-vector formalism is the special case of 
two-step histories in which the latest time projector is one-dimensional.) But equally, the formalism can be 
divested of this probability interpretation: these are ratios among squared amplitudes of state vectors, 
correlations among states, representing sequences of events, awaiting further interpretation. 
Now for Everett’s picture of a tree-like structure to the state. Given a decohering history space 
〈|𝜓⟩, 𝐻,ℳ, {𝛼!}〉, it is always possible to define a new decohering history space 〈|𝜓⟩, 𝐻,ℳ, {𝜖!}〉, where 
{𝜖!} is a fine-graining of {𝛼!}, with “branching structure” – in which histories only diverge to the future 
and never recombine.24 (Branching structure, like decoherence, was ensured for Everett’s automaton states, 





. ≈ 0	or	1.																																																	(7) 
The past of an event 𝜖! is therefore approximately unique. There is only one way, from a configuration at 
time 𝑡!, of tracing a preceding sequence of configurations; Everett’s concept of branching thus generalises. 
But to what is this temporal asymmetry to be traced? Evidently not to the unitary evolution, which is time-
reversal invariant. We earlier saw reasons to expect branching in the case of states initially well-localized 
in position and momentum – that is, in the structure of the initial state. The point applies more generally, 
and it is the same as the explanation of the arrow of time in classical statistical mechanics: it is to be sought 
in the structure of the initial state.25 Thus, if |𝜓⟩	 for a given Hamiltonian H and coarse-graining, {𝛼!} on 
ℳ defines a decoherent history space, which hence has branching structure, 𝐶4|𝜓⟩ does not.  
This point is worth perusing. What happens if we take a state like 𝐶4|𝜓⟩  as the initial state? Formally, as a 
Heisenberg-picture state, it is defined at 𝑡* = 0, like |𝜓⟩; if we pass to the Schrödinger picture, and unitarily 
evolve it forward in time, it is the state U(t)	𝐶4|𝜓⟩, which for 𝑡 = 𝑡- is the end-state of the Everett branch 
for the history 𝛼 at 𝑡-. It seems we have everything that we could wish for, a single history theory with a 
purely unitary evolution. But no: while there is a single branch vector at 𝑡 = 𝑡-, there are innumerable 
others at earlier times – indeed a superposition of non-orthogonal branches, all with amplitudes and phases 
delicately adjusted as they unitarily evolve so that they all interfere with each other at 𝑡- and all save one 
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wink out of existence. Moving forward in time, after 𝑡-, it is Everettian business as usual, and orthogonal 
branching, and no fine-tuning (unless, of course, the history space was fine-tuned to begin with).26 
Put now to one side the probability interpretation, and view norms and ratios in norms as mere correlations, 
mere relations among amplitudes and relative states. View Eqs. (6) and (7) as an extension of Everett 
relativization to times, and of correlations among states representing sequences of events. Understood in 
this way, the decoherent histories formalism provides a general language, a kind of four-dimensionalism, 
for describing the universal state, in which orthogonality of histories is as natural a criterion for a basis of 
states as is orthogonality of states in the case of a single time. As we have seen, it interestingly involves a 
direction in time, as determined by the initial state; what else does it involve? 
The concept of quasiclassical domain, introduced by Murray Gell-Mann and Jim Hartle in the late 1980s,27 
is of a consistent history space for which the coarse-grained variables, the 𝛼!’s for each k, approximately 
satisfy some closed system of equations, as they vary along each history; it is a history space made up only 
of certain kinds of sequences. Or more precisely (since any quantum history space contains all possible 
histories definable as sequences of values of the coarse-grained variables), those histories that do not 
conform to the equation have negligible norm in comparison to those that do. (We now see that the Born 
rule, in a way, falls in this category too.) It is then an open question as to whether and what kinds of 
quasiclassical domains may be found, with what kinds of equations, coarse-grained variables, initial states, 
and Hamiltonians.  
For a metaphysical way of putting it, a quasiclassical domain is defined when the universal state can be 
written as a superposition of histories almost all of which are lawlike; that almost all obey a definite rule or 
equation. They are histories of propagating quasiclassical states, obeying definite rules – just as envisioned 
by Everett. But now Von Neumann’s “elementary building blocks” are only one example.  
I gave the punch line in advance:  all the important, effective, non-relativistic equations for bulk matter, 
gasses, and fluids have now been obtained in this way.28 Of course several of them predate the quantum 
histories formalism, and implicitly or explicitly rely on the measurement postulates; but they can be cast 
into the quantum histories formalism, and we know how to interpret the measurement postulates in the 
Everett interpretation. Generically, these quasiclassical equations are only approximately satisfied: 
departures from them involve branching, and in some cases, as in classically chaotic systems, pervasive 
branching. The equations themselves may involve dissipation and noise. No wonder, then, that branching 
and worlds cannot be defined axiomatically; they are not defined at the microscopic level at all. They are 
emergent structures, to be extracted from the unitary equations for large numbers of particles, using methods 
similar to those that apply across the board in the physical sciences.29  
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The implications are far-reaching. For the first time, the Everett interpretation (and arguably quantum 
mechanics) is freed from any dependence on classical physics (despite the name “quasiclassical,” the 
equations that define a quasiclassical domain could in principle be entirely foreign to classical physics, the 
variables completely alien). It is no longer dependent on the concept of measurement; branching, and with 
it the preferred basis, is emergent structure, dynamically defined. The arrow of time in thermal and 
decoherence terms is aligned. Everett’s automaton argument is much stronger: the automaton itself need no 
longer be a mechanical system, but could be made of anything. More importantly, what can be recorded in 
its memory, corresponding to the sequence of its relative states, is not just the statistics of quantum 
experiments, but the observable law-like behavior of everything else that is going on in the laboratory – the 
entire phenomenology of materials, fluids, and gases, all in excellent agreement with experiment. In these 
respects, the Everett interpretation is much better than either pilot-wave theories or dynamical collapse 
theories. They solve the measurement problem, but rarely even try to obtain quasiclassical phenomenology 
(“the classical limit”) in their terms. (Of course, pilot-wave theory can always help itself to results obtained 
under the unitary formalism alone, since it too preserves the Schrödinger equation as universal – but thereby 
illustrating the epiphenomenal character of the hidden variables. See also Rosaler (2015).) 
 
4 Everett’s “Note Added in Proof”  
What to believe, in the face of all this evidence? Quantum mechanics may yet give way to a better theory, 
with an entirely different set of ideas. Doubts on the side of the probability interpretation may yet undermine 
the approach: see my companion paper. Experimental discoveries could as always change everything – of 
gravitationally induced state reduction, for example. Everett’s place in history remains uncertain. But what 
if the superposition principle, and low-energy quantum mechanics, is here to stay, with no hint of any 
further, “hidden” variables? 
Here is Everett’s last word on the matter, in his “Note added in proof,” added without Wheeler’s permission, 
the one place where we know he spoke in his own voice. It is fitting to reprint it in full:  
Note added in proof  – In reply to a preprint of this article some correspondents have raised the 
question of the “transition from possible to actual,” arguing that in “reality” there is – as our 
experience testifies – no such splitting of observer states, so that only one branch can ever actually 
exist. Since this point may occur to other readers the following is offered in explanation. 
The whole issue of the transition from “possible” to “actual” is taken care of in the theory in a very 
simple way – there is no such transition, nor is such a transition necessary for the theory to be in 
accord with our experience. From the viewpoint of the theory all elements of a superposition (all 
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“branches”) are “actual,” none any more “real” than the rest. It is unnecessary to suppose that all 
but one are somehow destroyed, since all the separate elements of a superposition individually obey 
the wave equation with complete indifference to the presence or absence (“actuality” or not) of any 
other elements. This total lack of effect of one branch on another also implies that no observer will 
ever be aware of any “splitting” process.  
Arguments that the world picture presented by this theory is contradicted by experience, because 
we are unaware of any branching process, are like the criticism of the Copernican theory that the 
mobility of the earth as a real physical fact is incompatible with the common-sense interpretation 
of nature because we feel no such motion. In both cases the argument fails when it is shown that 
the theory itself predicts that our experience will be what it in fact is. (In the Copernican case the 
addition of Newtonian physics was required to be able to show that the earth’s inhabitants would 
be unaware of any motion of the earth.)  
It was Galileo, not Newton, who rebutted that criticism of the Copernican theory, on the basis of an 
incomplete and, at points, faulty conception of the physics. Everett’s argument to show that we cannot be 
aware of branching (“splitting”) was likewise incomplete: it does not rest on linearity alone. Everett, like 
Galileo, did not have all the physics needed to show that the appearances would be as they seem. But there 
is another comparison that is even more informative: between Everett’s idea that all that there is are relative 
states and correlations, and the idea that all that there is are relative distances and relative velocities. The 
comparison is with Descartes. Both elevated a principle (the superposition principle; the principle of inertia) 
to universal status; both, in their different ways, had their writings suppressed. Both were transitional 
figures: neither was able to show, on dynamical grounds, what were the superposed worlds, what were the 
inertial motions. Both died young, their work unfinished. Each argued for his world-view in the same way: 
by a demonstration that to a mechanical being inhabiting such a universe, the world would seem exactly 
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